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Most ―mainstream‖ accounts of the West-East divergence gain theoretical inspiration from Max 
Weber and/or Karl Marx, and have therefore traced the ―rise‖ of the West to the unique social 
processes that apparently fostered capitalism in Europe. Critics have labelled these accounts 
―Eurocentric‖ insofar as they imply the inherent superiority of the West over the East,
1
 and they 
have offered alternative ―anti-Eurocentric‖ narratives which ostensibly avoid such analytical and 
normative pitfalls. These critics have succeeded in directing our attention to experiences in the 
non-European world. However, they have sought to validate these experiences by simply 
extending (in space and time), rather than transcending, the problematic concepts and 
assumptions that plagued the ―Eurocentric‖ Weberian and Marxist accounts of the origins of 
capitalism. This paper argues that a truly non-Eurocentric approach requires a definitive break 
with these assumptions and the adoption of an alternative historical materialist understanding of 
the origins of capitalism pioneered by Robert Brenner. While not explicitly conceived as non-
Eurocentric, Brenner‘s concept of social-property relations offers the surest foundation for 
understanding ―the great divergence‖ without doing violence to history or succumbing to 
European triumphalism.   
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1 See J. M. HOBSON, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 7.  
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lthough it has suffered from conceptual stretching,2 Eurocentrism usefully 
describes at least two problematic practices within the social sciences and 
humanities. The first is a tendency to simply ignore, devalue, and understate the 
significance of non-Western experiences. The primacy of Europe or the West is 
established by neglecting ―the Rest.‖ To the extent that non-Western experiences are 
considered, a second and more pernicious tendency is to take the Western achievement 
of capitalist modernity, liberal democracy and rationalism as the natural and most 
advanced path of historical development. In this case, Western primacy is established by 
suggesting that non-Western experiences are deviations from the norm, stemming from 
a number of ―obstacles,‖ ―blockages‖ or other barriers that prevent the non-West from 
proceeding along the garden path. 
 
There is strong reason to agree with J.M. Hobson‘s observation that Max Weber and Karl 
Marx, while appearing to offer sharply counter-posed theories of the rise of the West, 
promoted a common ―Eurocentric discourse.‖3 This can be evidenced most clearly by 
examining their explanations for the origins of capitalism. Weber‘s ―culturalist‖ account is 
typically, and usefully, contrasted with Marx‘s ―materialist‖ one. But it crucially important 
to recognize that both proceed from a shared premise: that the development of 
capitalism was a trans-European (or at least a trans-Western European process). Marx 
and Weber are thereby compelled to search for those intrinsic and essential 
characteristics which ―explain‖ the homogeneity of social outcomes in the West and the 
concomitant failure of the non-capitalist East. While seeking to historicize capitalism, 
Marx and Weber unwittingly naturalize both capitalism and Western ascendance through 
mutual reliance upon certain teleological narratives and ahistorical categories.   
 
Weber is widely recognized, even by his sharpest critics, for displaying a truly global 
range of interests and knowledge, seeking to identify the specificity of Western 
civilization as one among many historical patterns.4  Unlike many of his contemporaries, 
Weber highlighted underlying similarities between Western and non-Western social 
forms which could bring them into analytical equivalence. In his historical sociology all 
societies have specific constellations of distinctly political, religious, cultural and 
economic rationalities, such that Puritanism and Confucianism, for example, can both be 
considered forms of rational religious thought.5  As a transhistorically distinct sphere of 
social life, economic rationality and action were by no means the exclusive preserve of 
the early modern West.  Capitalist ―entrepreneurs‖ and ―undertakings,‖ defined as the 
pursuit of profit-making opportunities through market exchange, were ancient and ―well-
nigh universal.‖6   
                                                 
2 See Ellen WOOD, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London: Verso, 2002), 27.  
3 See HOBSON, 6. 
4 See Ellen Meiksins WOOD‟s discussion in Capitalism versus Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 153-154. 
5 Max WEBER, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York: Free Press, 1968). 
6 Max WEBER, “The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in Europe,” in W.G. RUNCIMAN (ed.), Weber: 
Selections in Translation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 335. 
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Much of Weber‘s work on ancient antiquity and China is therefore devoted to the 
problematique of explaining why these early capitalist forms failed to develop into 
mature capitalist societies7—what he terms ―rational private enterprise econom[ies].‖ It is 
here where the teleological implications of Weber‘s sociology come into view. Early 
modern Europe became a pioneer of dynamic capitalist development because it came to 
possess ―a specific type of ‗rationalism‘‖8  associated with rational technology, rational 
law, and—crucially—a general ―capacity and disposition‖ among men for practical 
rationality, unhindered by spiritual or religious concerns.9 The true significance of 
Weber‘s famous ―Protestant ethic,‖ then, is that it unshackled economic rationality qua 
capitalist activity—universally present across human history—from the myriad religious, 
cultural and political restrictions which had stifled its development in other civilizations, 
finally allowing it to assume natural prominence as the generalized and dominant form 
of rationality. In turning his gaze to non-Western civilizations, therefore, Weber tends to 
read history backwards from his interpretation of the European present, identifying the 
obstacles and impediments which ostensibly restrained the natural development of 
commerce and trade.10 In Chinese society, for example, there were numerous 
institutionalised expressions of economic rationality, including well-developed cities, 
widespread trade and commerce, wealth accumulation, technological improvement, and 
population growth. But they never yielded a mature capitalism because they were 
hemmed in by various impediments which restricted urban autonomy and the formation 
of a true bourgeoisie, such as an extensive kinship system, a patrimonial state, and a 
Confucian privileging of ―status‖ and familial obligations.11.  
 
On the face of it, Marx‘s materialist account of capitalism would seem to offer a 
compelling alternative, pivoting as it does upon a materialist rather than a cultural or 
ideational analysis. Yet what is widely accepted as the Marxist explanation of the 
capitalist transition, conventionally adopted by ―mainstream‖ accounts, has much in 
common with Weber. Especially in his early works, Marx presented a theory of historical 
development which suggested a relatively linear progression through different stages of 
mode of production, propelled by a tension between the forces and relations of 
production. Although the exact constitution of the productive forces is disputed, in these 
early works Marx seems to suggest that the division of labour directly expresses the level 
of development of the productive forces, in turn determining social relations of class and 
property.12 Thus the division of labour and corresponding level of technical development, 
                                                 
7 For China, see The Religion of China; for antiquity, see especially Weber‟s work Economy and Society. 
Fourth Edition (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978). 
8 WEBER, “The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in Europe”, 339.   
9 Ibid., 340. 
10 On this point see WOOD, Democracy versus Capitalism, 172. 
11 WEBER, The Religion of China. 
12 See Robert BRENNER, “Bourgeois Revolution and Transition to Capitalism,” in A.L. BIER, D. 
CANNADINE and J.M. ROSENHEIM (eds.), The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honor of 
Lawrence Stone (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 272. 
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rather than a particular form of rationality, is the independent variable in the traditional 
Marxist account. The uniqueness of European society (and thus the root of its divergence 
from the East) therefore lies in its productive dynamism. 
 
It seems, then, that the accounts of both Marx and Weber (and therefore many of their 
contemporary followers) at least partially adopt the ―worldview which asserts the 
inherent superiority of the West over the East‖13 that Hobson takes to be the hallmark of 
Eurocentrism. In Weber, Western superiority is ultimately marked by the triumph of a 
unique rationality which alone guarantees passage to modernity; while in Marx, 
superiority is signalled by the dynamic development of the productive forces, which 
propels passage to higher (historically more progressive) modes of production. Lacking 
these markers, ―the Rest‖ necessarily appears inferior in normative and analytical terms.   
 
There would appear to be two routes to establishing a non-Eurocentric alternative to 
prevailing Weberian and traditional Marxist discourse. The first would be to accept the 
theoretical assumptions of these classical models, but to suggest that the classical 
authors (and those who have followed in their footsteps) erred in the historical detail. 
The anti-Eurocentrist is then charged with the task of demonstrating that non-Western 
societies, too, possessed, ingenious economic rationality, technological dynamism, and 
growing productive forces or a deepening of the division of labour. This is the strategy 
pursued by the ―small band‖14 of influential anti-Eurocentric global historians and 
historical sociologists, most of whom have focused their attention on the ―Great 
Divergence‖ in living standards and geopolitical power between Europe and Asia in 
general, and Western Europe and China in particular.15 A second approach is to 
challenge the concepts, categories and assumptions offered by the classical authors, with 
the goal of formulating an alternative theory capable of assimilating and explaining 
historical detail and difference while at the same time refusing any notion that one 
development path is evidence or consequence of civilizational superiority. It is ironic that 
the kernel of such a theory has been provided by Robert Brenner‘s analysis of intra-
European social history.  
 
Assessing the Chinese case 
J.M. Hobson, Kenneth Pomeranz and R. Bin Wong adopt the first route. They go beyond 
familiar world-systemic narratives (e.g., Dussell)16 by insisting that a close examination of 
non-European experiences—particularly the Chinese—demonstrates not only the 
                                                 
13 HOBSON, 7. 
14 Ibidem, 3. 
15 Useful recent contributions to the “Great Divergence” debate can be found in a special issue of the 
Economic History Review, 64:S1 (2011); a short summary and assessment of the debate is contained in 
Stephen BROADBERRY and Steve HINDLE,“Editors‟ Introduction”, 1-7. David NORTHRUP argues that 
world history since 1000 CE is better conceived in terms of convergence rather than divergence. See 
“Globalization and the Great Convergence: Rethinking World History in the Long Term,” Journal of 
World History, 16(3) (2005): 249-267.  
16 Enrique DUSSELL, “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism,” Nepantia: Views from the South, 1.3 
(2000), p.472. 




victimization of the East, but also the East‘s comparatively advanced and progressive 
economy and technology. It is for this reason that Hobson identifies Eurocentrism as a 
worldview asserting the inherent superiority of the East. Hobson does not deny that the 
West did make a ―final breakthrough‖ to what he identifies as ―modern capitalism‖ 
around 1800—the problem is that Eurocentrists have assumed that this divergence was a 
product of the East‘s permanent non-development. In fact, between 500 and 1500 CE the 
East was ―the prime mover of world development,‖ displaying ingenuity, progressive 
properties, and other characteristic values of modernity.17 During this period of ―oriental 
globalization,‖ Western Europeans were ―inferior‖ to many of the world‘s other 
civilizations.18 Considerable ―economic progress‖ was evidenced across the East, from the 
―rational capitalist investors‖ and ―rational and progressive institutions‖ of the Islamic 
world to the industrial production and intensive (per capita) economic growth of Song 
China.19 
 
In Hobson‘s narrative, the Europeans proved to be ―neither sufficiently rational, liberal-
democratic nor ingenious to independently pioneer their own development.‖20 The 
West‘s breakthrough to modern capitalism therefore owed to its ability to acquire the 
advanced ―resource portfolios‖ (ideas, technologies, and institutions) of the East through 
processes of diffusion/assimilation and appropriation. The ―material‖ process of diffusion 
allows Hobson to explain why the West was able to catch up with the East despite its 
deficiencies--the diffusion of Chinese resource portfolios alone is credited with spurring 
an astonishing array of ―European‖ advances, from the Renaissance to the British 
agricultural revolution.21 Imperialist appropriation, which simultaneously enabled the 
plunder and exploitation of Eastern land, labour and markets as well as the 
―containment‖ of potential non-European economic rivals, explains why Europe was able 
to make the breakthrough to industrialism, first in Britain.22 Although Europe was unique 
in constructing an imperialist identity, Hobson stresses that a ―racist restlessness,‖ rather 
than a ―rational relentlessness,‖ was its hallmark.  
 
At first glance, Hobson‘s account might appear to offer a radical revision of conventional 
narratives. Yet what is most striking is the extent to which Hobson embraces classical 
(especially Weberian) assumptions about the nature of capitalist modernity as the 
pinnacle of human economic development and a product of rationality, ingenuity and 
progressive properties. It is entirely appropriate that Hobson concludes his work by 
likening world development to a relay race—the direction of the competition and the 
location of the finish line are given in advance.23 The novelty of Hobson‘s narrative 
                                                 
17 HOBSON, 20-1.  
18 Ibidem, 22. 
19 Ibidem, 297-8. 
20 Ibidem, 313.  
21 Ibidem, 22. 
22 Ibidem, 312. 
23 Ibidem, 316.  
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consists in adding extra participants to the race, each of whom carries the baton for a 
portion of what is a ―continuous process‖ of modernization.24 
 
This attempt to challenge Eurocentrism by geographically and temporally expanding the 
applicability of its concepts carries severe historical and theoretical limitations. First, by 
measuring ―progress‖ with a Weberian yardstick, Hobson is forced to obscure the 
historical complexity of both China and Europe. It is indeed notable that China exhibited 
a degree of ―industrial‖ production and per capita economic growth, but simply 
characterizing them as indicators of ―capitalism‖ does not explain their origins and limits. 
Likewise, Hobson‘s heavy emphasis on the diffusion/assimilation and appropriation of 
Chinese ―resource portfolios‖ is not only highly exaggerated; it obscures the indigenous 
dynamics of European development and ignores the tremendous diversity of experience 
within Europe itself. Second, even if the empirical detail of Hobson‘s narrative were 
perfectly correct, he would still not succeed in providing an adequate basis for non-
Eurocentric social theory. It may be possible to expand the number of civilizations that 
meet the Weberian criteria of superiority, but there will always be civilizations and 
peoples that do not fit. Hobson‘s framework permits two ways of dealing with them, 
both of which are inadequate: they can be sidelined as developmental failures, or the 
historical record can be strained and contorted to enable their inclusion among the ranks 
of the rational.  
 
Unfortunately, historical obfuscation and theoretical incoherence attend the two other 
significant attempts to challenge Eurocentrism on the basis of the Chinese example. In 
contrast with Hobson, Pomeranz (and to a lesser extent Wong) explicitly recognize 
regional variation within Europe and China, suggesting that a comparison of their most 
advanced regions (England and the Lower Yangzi Delta, respectively) provides the 
clearest indication of civilizational similarity.25 On this basis, Wong and Pomeranz argue 
that Britain and Europe evidenced symmetrical Smithian development paths, whereby an 
expanding population yielded increasing demand, encouraging increase in supply 
through specialization and growth of the division of labour.26 As a consequence, the two 
regions were roughly equivalent in many important respects, including in per capita 
income;27 the composition of the capital stock and economic institutions;28 core-
periphery relations and ―proto-industrialization‖;29 and extensive factor markets.30  
                                                 
24 Ibidem, 316. 
25 Kenneth POMERANZ, The Great Divergence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8; R. Bin 
Wong, “The Search for European Differences and Domination in the Early Modern World: A View 
from Asia,” American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 2 (April 2002): 447-469. 
26 For a summary of this causal chain, see Robert BRENNER and Christopher ISETT, “England‟s 
Divergence from China‟s Yangzi Delta: Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of 
Development,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May 2002), 610; and WONG, 454.  
27 POMERANZ, “Political Economy and Ecology on the Eve of Industrialization: Europe, China, and 
the Global Conjuncture,” American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No. 2 (April 2002), 429. 
28 POMERANZ, Great Divergence, 16.  
29 Ibidem, 31. 
30 POMERANZ, “Political Economy,” 430; Wong, 450. 





Like Hobson, Wong and Pomeranz suggest that aspects of ―capitalism‖ can be traced 
back centuries in both China and Europe, but that the crucial breakthrough was to 
industrial capitalism after 1800.31 Until that time both Britain and the Lower Yangzi were 
headed for a common Malthusian ―cul de sac‖ because of shortages of land and 
energy.32 A combination of technological inventiveness, imperial coercion, and luck 
enabled Britain to access new markets, lands and energy supplies and to organize new 
production in the colonial peripheries.33 Western ―breakthrough‖ therefore owed very 
little, if at all, to superior market dynamics and division of labour but instead to allegedly 
proximate and even accidental causes. Like Hobson, Pomeranz stresses the crucial role of 
Western imperialism—but since this imperialism was predicated upon ―deviations‖ from 
Smithian dynamics they do not signify Western superiority.34        
 
While more attentive to historical detail than Hobson and many others, their own 
reliance upon a classical framework does not enable Wong and Pomeranz to adequately 
interpret the detail they amass. For Wong and Pomeranz, an advanced economy is 
marked by the degree to which it has eliminated barriers to Smithian development, as 
indicated by the division of labour, extent of the market, and technological level.35 The 
result is an approach which Joseph Bryant characterizes as ―econometric 
historiography‖—the cross-regional comparison of quantitative indicators with 
insufficient attention to the potentially very different social relations underlying the 
data.36 Bryant, Phillip Huang, Robert Brenner and Christopher Isset have made many 
pertinent criticisms of Wong and Pomeranz‘s research; but most central is their common 
observation that the Chinese experience was involutionary, marked by growth (of output) 
without development (of labour productivity).37 Wong may still be correct to draw 
parallels with the ―industrious revolution‖ that Jan de Vries observes in early modern 
Europe,38 because  involutionary growth  allowed for greater output per unit of land, and 
                                                 
31 POMERANZ, Great Divergence, 16; Wong, 467. 
32 Ibidem, 23. 
33 Ibidem., 22-4. 
34 Ibidem., 24. As Ricardo DUCHESNE has pointed out, POMERANZ is keen to calculate the precise 
ecological benefits that Britain ostensibly garnered from its colonies, but is strangely silent about the 
imperialist expansions of the Ming and Qing dynasties which involved the colonization and outright 
integration of non-Han lands. See “On the Rise of the West: Researching Kenneth Pomeranz‟s Great 
Divergence,” Review of Radica Political Economics, 36:52 (2004), 76-77.   
35 Cf. POMERANZ, Great Divergence, 24.  
36 See the critique of POMERANZ in Joseph BRYANT, “The West and the Rest Revisited: Debating 
Capitalist Origins, European Colonialism, and the Advent of Modernity,” Canadian Journal of 
Sociology, 31:4 (2006), 421. Note that this particular criticism is concerned with the meaning and 
implications that POMERANZ draws from his data, rather than the accuracy of the data itself.  For a 
critique along latter lines, see DUCHESNE.  
37 See BRYANT, 423; Philip HUANG, “Review: Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain and China? A Review of Kenneth Pomeranz‟s „The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the 
Making of the Modern World Economy,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (May 2002), 512.  
38 R. B. WONG, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: 
Cornell, 1997), 30-1 For de Vries‟ explanation of the “industrious revolution,” see his “The Industrial 
Revolution and the Industrious Revolution,” Journal of Economic History, 54 (2) (1994): 249–270. 
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even per capita—but not per unit of labour. Thus, rather than embarking on a 
development path of productivity increase through specialization (as occurred in Britain), 
China experienced something of the opposite. Forced by population pressure to subsist 
on ever-smaller plots of land (while rendering hefty rents to landlords), peasants in the 
Lower Yangzi diversified their productive activities by engaging in new pursuits which, 
while requiring more intense labour, nevertheless allowed for higher incomes. The limits 
inherent in such a strategy conditioned the Lower Yangzi‘s descent into the Malthusian 
―cul de sac.‖  
 
Wong and Pomeranz‘s neglect of structural factors also leads to a highly unsatisfactory 
explanation of British developments. As Bryant points out, technological innovations and 
industry seem to appear almost spontaneously (as they do for Hobson), without any 
preparatory process that altered the domestic social relations of production, yielded the 
capacity for advanced technology and manufacturing, or created the financial and 
exchange circuits required for sustained investment.39 Eurocentrism is avoided, but only 
by refusing to undertake any serious historical explanation at all.   
 
Finally, even if we assume that the accounts offered by Wong and Pomeranz are correct 
in their empirical detail, it is once again doubtful that any basis has been laid for anti-
Eurocentric social theory. As Pomeranz notes, only three locations—western Europe, 
Japan, and China—were likely candidates for ―a dramatic shift in economic possibilities,‖ 
given their possession of certain Smithian attributes. Although this adds two members to 
the conventional Eurocentric roster, it necessarily excludes many others. How should the 
lack of Smithian development in Africa and the rest of Asia be interpreted, if not as 
developmental failure? As an empirically-minded historian, Pomeranz rightly distances 
himself from James Blaut‘s ―uniformitarian‖ suggestion that basically all regions of Afro-
Euarasia were undergoing transitions to ―protocapitalism‖ before 1492.40 However, 
Blaut‘s position is the only consistent way of maintaining a Smithian (or ―Smithian 
Marxist‖) framework without implicitly constructing a hierarchy of civilizations.   
 
Specifying capitalist development in Europe 
The dual problems of historical obfuscation and theoretical incoherence are not inherent 
in the anti-Eurocentric project. Instead, they stem from a misguided strategy of utilizing 
crucial assumptions and concepts of the classical model as the basis for assessing the 
Chinese experience. A compelling non-Eurocentric alternative can only be developed if 
the classical model is supplanted with new concepts adequate to the task of historical 
explanation. It may seem ironic that such concepts have been developed by historical 
materialist scholars, such as Brenner, who have focused on comparative European social 
history. However, a focus on difference within Europe demonstrates that the ―economic 
rationality‖ peculiar to capitalism has its origins in the unintended consequences of class 
struggles in England between lords and peasants during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
                                                 
39 BRYANT, 411.  
40 See POMERANZ, Great Divergence, 27; and Blaut, 370.  




centuries. In doing so he offered the first explanation of the origins of capitalism that did 
not confuse explanans with explanandum, and challenged the received Marxist models 
taken as reference points by the conventional anti-Eurocentrists.  
 
Rather than conceiving of a forces/relations dialectic propelling historical change, 
Brenner instead points to the radical difference between capitalism and all previous 
forms of class-stratified society. While technique, organization and technology have 
varied across time and place, in all pre-capitalist societies the production of most goods 
assumed a basically similar form – peasants cultivated the land they held in some form of 
direct possession (but not ownership in the contemporary capitalist sense). Surplus 
appropriation (and therefore class exploitation) did not generally occur at the point of 
production as it does in capitalist societies, but instead through the exercise of political 
power and (at least implicitly) violence/coercion, after the agricultural product had been 
cultivated. In pre-capitalist class societies, therefore, political and economic powers were 
fused, and in fact indistinguishable. Modes of exploitation are then meaningfully 
distinguished from each other by their form of ―social-property relations,‖ which Brenner 
defines as: 
the relations among direct producers, relations among exploiters, and relations 
between exploiters and direct producers that, taken together, make 
possible/specify the regular access of individuals and families to the means of 
production (land, labour, tools) and/or the social product per se. The idea is that 
such relations will exist in every society, and define the basic constraints on – and 
the possibilities and limits of – individual economic action.41  
 
In his discussion of European feudalism, Brenner sharply distinguishes between peasant 
and lordly relations of production. Peasants, he suggests, adopted a ―produce for 
subsistence‖ rule. To guarantee immediate subsistence and generational security, they 
minimized productive specialization, had large families, subdivided their holdings, and 
encouraged early marriage.42 Feudal lords, because they had minimal capacity to 
transform production, increased output and income only by ―extensive growth‖—carving 
out new lands, conquering new ones, etc.—as well as ―political accumulation,‖ or 
investment in the means of violence.  
 
In this light, the problem of accounting for the transition to capitalism is explaining how 
it was possible at all. Why would lords enclose on the direct producers who provide their 
wealth and security? Brenner‘s answer, which has been given important elaboration by 
George Comninel,43 is that capitalism emerged as an unintended consequence of class 
struggles in England specifically. The Black Death (c. 1348) and consequent depopulation 
occurred throughout the continent, jeopardizing the normal rules of reproduction that 
                                                 
41 Robert BRENNER, “Property and Progress: Where Adam Smith Went Wrong,” in Chris WICKHAM 
(ed.), Marxist History-writing for the Twenty-first Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 58. 
42 Ibid., 69. 
43 George COMNINEL, “English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism,” Journal of Peasant Studies, 
27(4):1-53. 
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once governed lordly accumulation. In France, peasant communities were able to secure 
rights of inheritance and fixed rents against their lords, even as new powers of politically-
mediated appropriation were formed by tax-office absolutist states.44 In England, 
however, a very different path was followed. Here, depopulation also turned the terms of 
class struggle against the lords, and attempts to re-impose feudal exactions failed. 
Whereas the serfs were once obliged to perform a certain amount of labour upon the 
lords‘ demesne, they were now relieved of labour-rent obligations and obliged to only 
pay money rents on their customary tenancies.45 
 
This initial peasant victory set in motion a series of interconnected events which 
eventually yielded agrarian capitalism. Lacking traditional extra-economic powers of 
surplus extraction, in the mid-fifteenth century the lords began to rent their demesne 
land to the highest bidder, i.e., they established variable ―economic‖ rents. Although this 
would have otherwise had no consequence for customary tenants, the English common 
law (absent in France) enabled the lords to gradually claim exclusive right to common 
lands. There thus began a process—largely ―legal‖—by which common lands and rights 
were extinguished, and lords increasingly asserted their right to enact variable rents on 
customary holdings as well.46 Peasant access to the land (the means of subsistence) 
became conditional upon meeting a market-determined rent. For tenants, production for 
the market was now an imperative, rather than an opportunity—they had to specialize, 
innovate, and improve productivity just to ensure their self-reproduction. These capitalist 
social-property relations, therefore, induced a wholly new ―systematic and continuous 
tendency or drive to transform production in the direction of greater efficiency,‖47, while 
also creating a new tripartite class structure of landlord, capitalist, and proletarian.  
 
This result differed markedly from that of France, where enduring peasant possession of 
land ensured the maintenance of pre-capitalist rules of reproduction. There, a secular 
tendency of declining labour productivity set in as peasant families subdivided their 
holdings over generations. To subsist, many peasant families necessarily supplemented 
their income with wages and ―proto-industrial‖ production; but ―tenant farming and 
wage labor had changed little since the crisis of the fourteenth century…whereas 
capitalism had totally transformed the agriculture of England.‖48 
 
This perspective does not simply replace Eurocentrism with Anglo-centrism in searching 
for the origins of a ―new and higher mode of production,‖ as James Blaut has accused.49 
                                                 
44 Mike ZMOLEK, “Further Thoughts on Agrarian Capitalism: A Reply to Albritton.” Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 29(1), 136. 
45 Larry PATRIQUIN, “The Agrarian Origins of the Industrial Revolution in England,” Review of 
Radical Political Economics, 36:2 (2004), 204. 
46 Ibidem, 206-8. 
47 Robert BRENNER, “The Social Basis of Economic Development,” in John ROEMER (ed.), Analytical 
Marxism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 24. 
48 George COMNINEL, Rethinking the French Revolution (London: Verso, 1987), 192-3. 
49 James BLAUT, “Robert Brenner in the Tunnel of Time,” Antipode, 26:4 (1994), 361-2. 




Rather, it challenges the very notion that capitalism should be conceived as a ―higher‖ 
mode, suggesting that capitalist social-property relations were in no way a product of 
―superior‖ rationality, technology, productiveness, or depth of the market (none of which 
England possessed).50  
 
A focus on social-property relations confronts the Eurocentrists empirically, by 
demonstrating that capitalism was not a European phenomenon; but, more importantly, 
it confronts them theoretically by providing an explanation of capitalism‘s origin which 
does not imply that its absence elsewhere stemmed from developmental failure or 
blockages. Instead, societal actors in non-capitalist societies are shown to have engaged 
in patterns of political-economic action which, while certainly distinct from the 
―economic rationality‖ of capitalism, were nevertheless completely ―rational‖ given the 
specific structure of social-property relations they confronted. Thus, Brenner and Isett 
forcefully demonstrate that the Lower Yangzi‘s involutionary growth differed markedly 
from the self-sustaining capitalist growth of England, but they do so by explaining how 
such a pattern was produced and reproduced through the actions of  peasant producers 
struggling to meet subsistence needs with ever-diminishing plots and onerous fixed 
rents. Not only were such patterns of political-economic action ―rational,‖ they were also 
similar in many respects to patterns existing at the same time in continental Europe, such 
as France.51 Indeed, proto-industry and attendant commercialization often figured in 
peasant strategies of reproduction in pre-capitalist societies, in circumstances where 
partibility had been carried out to such an extent that individual plots can no longer 
meet basic subsistence needs.52 When viewed through the lens of social-property 
relations, then, the story of early modern world history is not that Western Europe 
surpassed the ―rest‖ (as Weber , Marx, and the traditional ―wise of the West‖ literature 
would have it), nor is it that all of Europe and China were developmentally  equivalent (as 
the revisionist anti-Eurocentric scholars suggest). Instead, Britain (and perhaps Holland) 
experienced a wholly new dynamic of self-sustaining growth through capitalist social 
relations, entailing unprecedented growth in urbanization, land concentration, 
population, and labour productivity.53 Throughout the rest of the world—in continental 
Europe and Asia—ruling classes continued to rely upon various forms of extra-economic 
coercion to extract surpluses from land-holding peasants, allowing only for the familiar 
Malthusian cycle of involutionary growth followed subsistence crisis.  It is significant, in 
this context, that a recent quantitative comparison of living standards in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Europe, China, Japan, and India concludes that ―it was only England 
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and the Low Countries that pulled ahead of the rest. The rest, in this context, includes 
not only Asia but also much of Europe.‖54 
 
That France and other Western European countries made a transition to capitalism in the 
nineteenth century must then be explained not on the basis of civilizational 
rationality/productiveness or pure contingency, but as a process by which state elites 
forcibly imposed the capitalist form of social-property relations first (unintentionally) 
developed in England centuries earlier. For if capitalism originally emerged in England as 
an unintended consequence of agrarian class struggle, its subsequent institution in 
Western Europe and beyond was very much intended. Basing himself on Brenner‘s social-
property approach, Benno Teschke has persuasively argued that the spread of capitalism 
was a geopolitical process in which pre-capitalist state classes had to design 
counterstrategies of reproduction to defend their position in an international 
environment which put them at an economic and coercive disadvantage. More often 
than not, it was heavy artillery that battered down pre-capitalist walls, and the 
construction and reconstruction of these walls required new state strategies of 
modernization.55 Absolutist ―rules of reproduction‖ came under increasing strain from 
the geopolitical competition imposed by Britain‘s uniquely dynamic and productive 
capitalist economy. The international expansion of capitalism is therefore best 
understood as a geopolitically combined and socially uneven process, whereby pre-
capitalist state classes had to design counter-strategies of reproduction to survive in an 
international environment. These strategies were not uniform, and were always refracted 
through pre-existing domestic class relations. The transposition of capitalism to the West 
European continent and the rest of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
was therefore riddled social conflicts, from civil and international wars, and revolutions 
and counter-revolutions.56 This lays the basis for explaining the ―rise‖ of the West and the 
―achievements‖ of the Rest in terms which neither obfuscate the historical record nor 
ascribe superiority to any particular developmental experience.57 
 
Conclusion 
The conventional anti-Eurocentric accounts—represented here by Pomeranz, Wong and 
Hobson—have made a significant contribution to knowledge by uncovering non-
European experiences long neglected by social scientists and historians. A focus on 
imperial China‘s comparatively extensive market relations and dynamic technological 
development carries the potential to challenge Eurocentrism. However, these anti-
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Eurocentric assessments have sought to validate and interpret the Chinese experience by 
adopting many of the key concepts and assumptions of the classical paradigms they 
seek to undermine, most centrally Weberian and Smithian (including ―Smithian Marxist‖) 
conceptions of capitalism. In awkwardly attempting to pigeonhole Chinese 
developments, these authors have fail the task of historical explanation; in upholding 
classical notions of what constitutes historical ―progress‖ and ―advance,‖ they fall far 
short of developing a genuinely non-Eurocentric social theory. An effective alternative to 
Eurocentrism can only be developed by challenging, not reinforcing, the theoretical 
bases of the reigning paradigms. By identifying social-property relations as the key 
determinant in structuring historical processes, Robert Brenner provides a theoretical 
basis for explaining historical similarity and difference in a way that radically undermines 
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